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My dying breath is a magician.
Aug 31st, 2010 by notebooker

My dying breath is a magician.

This sits, written in chalk dust, on the board, bored bored bored board. Metaphor, all three elements from Aristotle, those elements it’s not supposed to have (supposedly), the tradition that’s opposed (opposedly) by Lakoff and Derrida, with metaphor as domain translations or catechresis as metaphoric literality.

The moment that is unexplainable is the new. The poetic metaphor. That which is ruled out of court or which doesn’t fit into the domain maps of Lakof (is it one F or two?) and Johnson, that which doesn’t accept itself as catechresis, which isn’t reducible to simply a concept. He focuses on one moment. For some of the terms of the proportion there is at times no word in existence; still the metaphor may be used. Each time the word that seems to be used is a good metaphor and allows someone to see something.

I never know what to make of this. I remember a long time ago a science fiction story about a community of blind people, about the way in which they adapt their social environment to become a touchable space and interlacing bodies, about – I think – someone on the run who takes refuge in this community, about the strange eroticism of the body in a space where the blind revel in exploring the positivity of the touch that is dominant without ever falling foul of a notion of lack (there is never any lack).

To talk of seeing things is just too facile. So they use the greek don’t they – theorein – to see. Theoria, theoros, the spectator, theoreo, to look at. Supposedly. The greek root seems to be thea. My dictionary cites it as ‘a seeing, looking at’ as well as, in the listing before that which mentions sight – with a minor change of accent – goddess. But they wouldn’t deign to speak of the goddess.

My dying breath is a magician.

The story, the anecdote (good philosophy always needs a good anecdote), is about a lecturer on Hegel, Professor Harris, this is Paul’s anecdote not mine, a lecturer on Hegel who is tedious, boring, Hegelian (all Hegelian’s are fools) and who is being listened to by Paul and his colleague and Paul turns to his colleague and says ‘Harris is Quixote’ but not the Quixote of the first book alone but also of the second where the Quixote of the first book victimises the Quixote of the second who is the real Quixote of the fictional Quixote that Cervantes invents who now reveals Harris as tilting at Hegelian windmills. ‘Harris is Quixote’ is said with some humour but Harris is then lost, like the Quixote of the second book, under the weight of the metaphor, the new vision.

I see him anew. This is the only form of new metaphor. I see it anew.

My dying breath is a magician.

I sit and stare at this chalk dust line. The magician brings about a magical event. The magician transforms things.

Like a dying breath.

My dying breath is a magician.

My explanation is death.

The metaphor can be paraphrased but the poem cannot.

My explanation is death.

"Metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or by analogy, that is, proportion. Thus from genus to species, as: ‘There lies my ship’; for lying at anchor is a species of lying. From species to genus, as: ‘Verily ten thousand noble deeds hath Odysseus wrought’; for ten thousand is a species of large number, and is here used for a large number generally. From species to species, as: ‘With blade of bronze drew away the life,’ and ‘Cleft the water with the vessel of unyielding bronze.’ Here arusai, ‘to draw away’ is used for tamein, ‘to cleave,’ and tamein, again for arusai- each being a species of taking away. Analogy or proportion is when the second term is to the first as the fourth to the third. We may then use the fourth for the second, or the second for the fourth. Sometimes too we qualify the metaphor by adding the term to which the proper word is relative. Thus the cup is to Dionysus as the shield to Ares. The cup may, therefore, be called ‘the shield of Dionysus,’ and the shield ‘the cup of Ares.’ Or, again, as old age is to life, so is evening to day. Evening may therefore be called, ‘the old age of the day,’ and old age, ‘the evening of life,’ or, in the phrase of Empedocles, ‘life’s setting sun.’ For some of the terms of the proportion there is at times no word in existence; still the metaphor may be used. For instance, to scatter seed is called sowing: but the action of the sun in scattering his rays is nameless. Still this process bears to the sun the same relation as sowing to the seed. Hence the expression of the poet ‘sowing the god-created light.’ There is another way in which this kind of metaphor may be employed. We may apply an alien term, and then deny of that term one of its proper attributes; as if we were to call the shield, not ‘the cup of Ares,’ but ‘the wineless cup’." (Aristotle, Poetics, XXI)

Blu19
Apr 17th, 2008 by notebooker

bomb_hugger This is an old Real audio radio programme I made.  I’ve been thinking of doing some more work with sound and so dug this out and had a listen and I still find it interesting, so it has an audience of 1 at least ;-)

Blu19 real audio file (right click to save-as)

If anyone can convert it to an MP3 then that would be cool (I don’t have an app on my machine and am not about to buy one just for this one task) – you can upload files to the anonymous FTP server at razorsmile.org if you do happen to convert it…

embarrassment
Jun 14th, 2007 by notebooker

teaching the machine
Mar 13th, 2007 by notebooker

There’s this peculiar video that’s on YouTube at the moment, an excellent example of contemporary pedagogy in many ways, called ‘The machine is Us/ing Us’. It’s gathered nearly 2 million hits and since it’s only about 4 minutes long, probably most of those people have watched it. There’s a beautifully slick feel to the way the video performs itself. It’s about the ‘Web 2.0′ (the new ‘social web’) and it makes use of the text inputs we make on the ‘net all the time to mix and edit between them, presenting its ideas as the video progresses.

The main thesis seems quite basic, though one that needs to be kept in mind perhaps, and that is that the new forms of communication are not, in fact, communication but connection. They do not allow the easier flow of some pre-existing material but in fact constitute new material, new connections and new flows (even though they also might allow the easier flow of existing material). It seems reasonably positive, reasonably human, reasonably thoughtful. In effect I agree with what Michael Wesch says (the maker of the video and assistant professor of anthropology at Kansas Sate University). I also applaud his skill and ability to produce this piece. There was, however (of course there’ll be a ‘however’ ;-) one phrase that occurred that stuck in my mind and which seemed, how shall I say it, strange. It seemed, at the very least, strange. Read the rest of this entry »

Images of difference
Jan 26th, 2007 by notebooker


odilon_redon_originofvision

Originally uploaded by razorsmile.

On Wednesday this week (24th Jan) in the MA Seminar I spoke about the role of images within ‘Difference and Repetition’ (DR). They are important because the thought of difference that Deleuze is developing within DR is a ‘difference before identity’ and our thought patterns and culture are so imbued with ‘identity’ thinking that it can be strange to try and think of a primary ontological difference. The beginning of Chapter 1 of DR (Difference in itself) is ripe with a series of images, from the lightning flash, the black indeterminacy as against the white indeterminacy, as well as Goya and Odilon Redon in reference to ‘chiaroscuro’. The image here is from Odilon Redon and is called ‘The origin of vision’. In it I find something of this dark chaotic difference that is the primary ontological category and the ‘individuation’ (coming to be) of an object or organ before it’s integration into any sort of system of organisation that might constitute a ‘full identity’. The single eye and the feathered surroundings that appear like the eyelashes catch a sense of an almost fetishistic vision, one in which we catch sight of things not through a simple appearance but precisely because the thing, our interests and the relations between them constitute an individuation from out of a chaotic set of forces that is difference in itself.
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Some more books to read
Nov 19th, 2006 by notebooker

I’ve been ill these last few days and aside from musing on set theory, differential calculus and the virtual/actual distinction in Deleuze, have come across a couple of lists of interesting books that I’d like to take a look at. The first, a list from someone I’ve known online for years, is an eclectic and strange list with numerous suggestions that I’ll no doubt follow up in the course of time. I’ll post the list in another entry just after this one.

The other odd list of books derived from a link on ‘Arts and Letters Daily‘, an excellent gathering place of all sorts of strange and wonderful things. It works a little like boingboing, digg, and the like in forming a kind of clearing house for articles around a theme but unlike the others has an agenda that – shall we say – ‘panders to the intelligentisa’. It’s a little knowing and bourgeois but nonetheless an execllent resource.

The link that I followed began with ‘philosophical detective novels…‘ and is a short discussion of a variety of such novels. Aside from the supposed instigator of this genrte – Umberto Eco and his ‘Name of the rose’ – a whole range of other authors, both philosophers and non-philosophers, are mentioned. The ‘Critique of criminal reason’ caught my eye, for example, and I think I may somehow see if I can pass this list around to my family and encourage them to buy some of the books here as their gifts.

The reason the detective novel link caught my eye is because Deleuze, in his introduction to ‘Difference and repetition’, talks about the need to write philosophy in a new way and specifically mentions the detective novel as an exmaple or suggestion as to what exactly this new mode of philosophy would look like. It’s curious, in a sense, that this genre is already developing ‘naturally’ (as it were) and is something that reflects an increasing awareness, perhaps, that one of the main skills philosophy offers is the ability to disentangle threads of reality.

Robots, art and asking questions
Oct 7th, 2006 by notebooker

The following came through my email via the nettime list today. The artist in question is not someone I’ve heard of before but someone I will definitely be looking at now. I even had a fleeting thought of trying to get over to see The Helpless Robot.

There’s something fascinating in this type of approach – the way in which White, towards the end of the interview, refuses to be classed as either self-expression art or straightforward science offers some glimpses into the reason for this. Somehow we need to maintain and develop the machines we have developed, that machines that are so intimately related to our nature that we could name ourselves as ‘the machines that now develop us’. Our relation with the machine is intimate and loving, not hostile, even if we might think that the culture we now live in seems to drive machines into the earth a little too fast.

Any odd formatting in the piece is a artifact of the email, as are line breaks. I’m correcting them as I notice them…

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